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THE INITIATION OF NEW DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

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Much has been written about a possible incompatibility between democracy and economic liberalization, on the one hand, and democracy and the cultural legacy left by forty years of Leninist rule in Eastern Europe, on the other. This paper responds to such claims with a concrete and quotidian investigation of the initiation of new democratic institutions in four East European countries.

The study has three parts. It first sketches a set of assumptions and predictions about the behavior of political elites in a stylized but not idealized democracy. It then compares these predictions with the behavior of contemporary politicians in any other democratic setting -- as they largely do -- this investigation undermines claims about the importance of a distinctive Leninist legacy for elite political behavior in post-Leninist democracies. The third section compares the situation in Eastern Europe with that in Latin America during transitions from authoritarianism. In this section, I discuss both the politics of institutional choice and the interaction between economic hardship and mass political behavior.

The comparison between Eastern Europe and Latin America yields some suggestions about elements of the Leninist legacy that have immediate political relevance but have received little attention from observers. Among the most important are the institutional blank slate left by the "Leninist extinction," to use Kenneth Jowitt"s phrase; and the near absence of autonomous interest groups (with the partial exception of labor in Poland) that either are or could quickly be linked to class- or interest-based parties.

The result of the general disorganization of interest groups and the weak linkage between urban labor and political parties is that the parts of the population most hurt by the transition to capitalism have not had much ability to make effective demands for policy changes. This is not to say that they are totally powerless. They have strikes, demonstrations, and the vote, which can be used as a blunt instrument with which to punish incumbents held responsible for policies that have caused welfare losses. Without party leadership to articulate an alternative economic ideology and coordinate an alliance of multiple interests that could benefit from an alternative set of economic policies, the ability of losers to interfere with the transition to capitalism is limited. They can slow it down, but they canot divert it onto an altogether different road.

The transition to capitalism is moving most slowly in Eastern Europe not in those countries in which competitive political systems give injured interests the greatest opportunity to resist

reforms, but in the least democratic countries in which renamed communist parties have retained most power. The impediment to reform in these countries is not injured interests empowered by democracy, but rather vested interests within and allied to regimes that have been modified by recent political events but not fundamentally changed.

The experience of Eastern Europe with economic liberalization thus does not differ greatly from that of Latin America or Southern Europe. In both regions, several democratic countries have carried out important steps in the direction of economic liberalization that entailed large costs to substantial parts of the population without causing regime breakdown.

The Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America

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THE INITIATION OF NEW DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA[1]

In a series of articles and an influential book, Kenneth Jowitt argues that forty years of rule by Leninist regimes has resulted in a cultural legacy in Eastern Europe that can be expected to undermine both democracy and capitalism.[2] Beginning from completely different assumptions, other observers have suggested that the economic costs to much of the population inherent in the transition to capitalism can be expected to jeopardize the survival of democracy in ex-communist countries.[3]

We do not know at this time whether most transitions from Leninism will, perhaps after a period of transitional turbulence, result in competitive regimes; nor do we know how many of the currently democratic ex-Leninist polities will suffer interludes of authoritarianism in the future. Consequently, we cannot judge the foresightfulness and insightfulness of the various predictions of disaster. We can, however, examine the recent behavior of political elites and masses in Eastern Europe to see if they display signs of either the Leninist cultural legacy described so persuasively by Jowitt or the lack of support for democracy in the face of high economic costs expected by a number of other scholars. And we can compare the behavior of Eastern Europeans with the behavior of Latin Americans in similar circumstances as a means of identifying what is truly unique about the Leninist legacy.

This paper responds to the claims about the incompatibility between democracy and various features of Eastern European reality with a concrete and quotidian investigation of the initiation of new democratic institutions in four East European countries. Much of the scholarly literature on Eastern Europe has been written by observers who have had little experience studying real democracies, and hence have somewhat unrealistic expectations about them. This study, in contrast, draws its assumptions and basic theoretical framework from the literature on democracies in the US and Western Europe.

The study has three parts. It first sketches a set of assumptions and predictions about the behavior of political elites in a stylized but not idealized democratic polity. It then compares these predictions with the behavior of contemporary politicians in Eastern Europe. To the extent that East European politicians turn out to act like politicians in any other democratic setting, this investigation undermines claims about the importance of a distinctive Leninist legacy for elite political behavior in post-Leninist democracies. The third section compares the situation in Eastern Europe with that in Latin America during transitions from authoritarianism. In this section, I discuss both the politics of institutional choice and the interaction between economic hardship and mass political behavior. The comparison between Eastern Europe and Latin America yields some suggestions about elements of the Leninist legacy that have immediate political relevance but have received little attention from observers.

The issue focus of this paper is on the negotiations over and choice among specific new democratic institutions. Many other policy areas might have been chosen, but several analysts have suggested that the specific institutional characterisitics of new democracies influence their ability to pursue effective economic policy and hence their long-term political stability.[4] This issue area thus seems to have special relevance for the questions raised above.

The East European countries treated here are Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. I limit this excursion into East European politics to only four cases simply to keep the task manageable. These particular cases were selected, first, to exclude the effect of extreme ethnic nationalism on institutional outcomes. Though ethnic nationalism is a very important cause of institutional choice in Eastern Europe, I exluded countries likely to split or disintegrate into civil war partly to reduce confusion and partly to increase cross-regional comparability. The amount of ethnic strife experienced in these four cases is more typical of other developing countries than is the former Yugoslavia. Second, I chose these cases in order to have some variation in level of

development, the role of mass participation in the overthrow of the old regime, and institutional outcome. The Latin American material draws primarily on the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, countries at levels of development comparable to the range in Eastern Europe and that have all experienced at least one transition to democracy since World War II.

Explanations of Institutional Choice

Let us turn now to the investigation of how specific new democratic institutions are chosen in transitional and post-Leninist political systems. The two central questions to be answered in this section are: whether the norms, logic, or incentives that motivate the choices of politicians in post-Leninist systems lead to different outcomes than would be expected in countries with a longer history of democratic experience; and whether institutional choice seems to have been affected by economic hardship or imperatives of the transition to capitalism.

Past Efforts to Explain Institutions

Two literatures on the emergence of political institutions currently exist. The first, pioneered by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan links party systems and electoral laws to the major historical events experienced by countries and the ethnic, religious, and economic cleavages created and maintained by these events.[5] Recent work by Michael Coppedge and Timothy Scully has used a similar perspective to explain different kinds of party systems in Latin America.[6] Though some insights can be drawn from this literature of relevance to the post-communist world,[7] its direct utility for explaining the emergence of new political institutions in Eastern Europe is limited. Industrialization under communist auspices created neither the basic capital-labor cleavage nor the autonomous mass participation interest-based organizations (except in Poland) assumed by Lipset and Rokkan, and therefore most parts of the model cannot be directly transferred to Eastern Europe.

The second existing literature has been developed mostly by economists. Most economic explanations of institutional change rely on efficiency gains, often taking into account transaction costs, to explain the evolution of new institutions.[8] Since they have usually not taken into account collective action problems or other issues involving the distribution of gains from efficiency, however, they have not provided explanations for the persistence of inefficient institutions.[9] Furthermore, these arguments have generally sought to explain institutions at a fairly abstract level (firms as a form of organizaiton, efficient property rights with the details unspecified), rather than explaining concrete differences among institutions. When it is not clear which institution is more efficient (e.g. presidentialism or parliamentarism), economists' arguments offer little help in understanding outcomes.

In short, attempts to explain the emergence of concrete political institutions in Eastern Europe do not fit very well into conventional paradigms. It is often not obvious which economic interests will benefit from one form of political system as opposed to another, and it is often not obvious which set would be more efficient, or even what efficiency would mean in this context.

In contrast to abstract economic arguments, two political arguments of considerable analytic sophistication seek specifically to explain a particular institutional outcome, the strength of the presidency. Matthew Shugart and John Carey note a correlation between weak parties and strong presidencies in Latin America and argue that legislatures made up of weak parties tend to delegate powers to the president as a way of overcoming immobilism.[10] Shugart suggests an extension of this argument to Eastern Europe.[11] Arend Lijphart, drawing on East European case materials, argues that presidentialism is a response to uncertainty about the future, an attempt to hedge bets by creating more than one possibility of winning office.[12] These arguments are both plausible, but, as will be shown below, some of the details posited do not fit the historical sequence of events in East European countries very well.

Most descriptions of the current round of institutional choice in Eastern Europe stress either the imitation of foreign institutions or the relationship between the continued power of communist successor parties and the deviation of rules chosen from democratic ideals. These discussions capture an aspect of reality, but they miss more.

The discussions of borrowing offer no explanation for why one system is copied rather than another and no explanation for why all East European countries have revised and adapted the systems they have borrowed. One might expect that, in a situation in which the effects of a decision on material interests are not obvious, East European constitution writers concerned about stability and economic performance might simply choose the most obviously successful system (perhaps West Germany) and copy it. Only Hungary has done so, however, and even in Hungary apparently minor revisions to the electoral system greatly reduce its proportionality and thus lead to an outcome quite different from the German.[13]

The continued dominance of communist successor parties explains the continued existence of a number of undemocratic features in constitutions, but not the main features of the political systems. In the cases examined, communist parties all pressed for strong presidents and majoritarian electoral systems (ironically, the US system) during initial negotiations with the opposition, but the strongest presidency among these cases is in Poland not Romania, and the most majoritarian electoral system is in Hungary not Romania, though Romania has much the strongest successor party.

Institutions as Weapons in the Struggle for Political Survival

In contrast to the various literatures discussed above, my attempt to explain institutional change and resistance to change begins with two assumptions drawn explicitly from standard treatments of democratic politics:[14] that those who make the changes -- that is, the members of round tables, constituent assemblies, and legislatures who must make the choices that determine electoral procedures -- pursue their own individual interests above all else; and that their interests center on furthering their

political careers. This political self-interest predisposes them to favor some institutional arrangements and oppose others. In advancing this argument, I do not deny that political leaders represent the interests of constituents and prefer some policies to others. But for politicians considering institutional changes, interest in furthering their careers usually converges with interest in achieving the policy goals of their constituents. The same institutions that will improve their chances of winning elections will also improve their chances of achieving policy goals since the greater the likelihood that they and their party allies will be elected, the greater the chance of passing the legislation they favor.

As I have shown in earlier work, the institutional preferences of the self-interested politicians who create new democratic political systems depend on their roles (e.g., legislator), which societal interests their parties represent and rely on for votes, and whether their parties are rising or declining relative to others. Most obviously, for example, members of small parties, declining parties, and parties with an uncertain future will prefer proportional representation. The feasible alternatives from which they have to choose are determined by the pre-existing institutional context and the distribution of strength among parties.[15]

This approach, which works quite well explaining institutional change in Latin America, faces several potential problems when applied to contemporary Eastern Europe. Foremost among them is the extreme volatility of the political and party context at the time of institutional choice. In all the countries examined, the communist parties had tremendous advantages over other parties in terms of local organization, control of government resources and patronage, and control of the media as transitions began. Between 1989 and 1992, however, support for communist parties and their successors declined, in most countries dramatically, as did their control of political resources.[16] Meanwhile, new parties arose as though by spontaneous generation -- in some countries over two hundred of them. In rapid succession, new parties were born, split, fused, died,

survived, and, in some cases, prospered. The distribution of power among the parties altered radically over time, as did the existing institutional environment.

Nevertheless, even though political circumstances changed rapidly and at first unpredictably, institutional choices are made at particular times, and, at any particular time, it is possible to identify the pre-existing institutional context, as well as the parties and individuals who influence choices. It is also possible to observe which parties are declining and which growing and what preferences are expressed in negotiations and votes.

The extreme fluidity of the East European political context thus does not render impossible explanations based on the political interests of politicians, but it does lead to the need to incorporate timing into the explanation. In all four cases examined for this study, initial institution design resulted from negotiations between the communists and their successors on the one hand and one or more opposition groups on the other. Outcomes varied with the perceived strength, and hence bargaining power, of the two sides, which changed over time as communist parties declined. Outcomes were also influenced, especially in the second round of institutional changes, by the degree of fragmentation and other characteristics, to be discussed below, of the opposition parties. Fragmentation of both communist and opposition parties tended to increase over time.[17]

Timing, Misperception, and Uncertainty

Communist parties enjoyed their greatest negotiating power while uncertainty prevailed about whether the withdrawal of the Soviet threat to intervene in the internal affairs of East European countries was real, that is, prior to fall 1989. In early spring 1989, when the Polish Round Table took place, the communists could get most of what they wanted in the institutional domain in return for allowing the opposition the right to legal organization and participation in the political process. "Solidarity did not seriously press for the holding of completely free elections in June, 1989...."[18]

Once the reality of the Soviet withdrawal had become certain, however, the situation with regard to both bargaining strength and information about party strength underwent a dramatic change. Communist parties had to assess their ability to compete in competitive electoral systems, an area in which they had no practical experience (with the partial exception of Hungary) and little information. Prior to the first elections and the freeing of the media, both communist and opposition parties systematically overestimated communist support.

As long as the media are controlled and opposition parties are not permitted to mobilize political campaigns that disseminate their views to large numbers of people, most people's opinions, as expressed in surveys and votes, will reflect the views carried in the controlled media.[19] All political leaders depend to some extent on votes and opinion polls as means of judging public opinion and their own political standing, but communist leaders were even more dependent on these forms of information about public opinion than the average democratic leader since local party organizations generally failed to transmit expressions of discontent to the top, and other forms of public expression were strongly discouraged. The opinions shaped by a controlled media are highly volatile, however, and subject to rapid and radical change once people are exposed to competing points of view.[20] Political elites in Eastern Europe, like military rulers in Latin America before them, were surprised by the rapid disintegration of regime support once the articulation of opposition views became possible.

Prior to 1989, only in Poland had Solidarity's earlier success and the quasi-legalization of what had been samizdat publications during the economic reforms of the eighties created an opposition information flow that had already reached a significant part of the population.[21] As a result, popular opposition to the communist regime in Poland had become widespread and highly visible. Polish communist leaders were aware that they probably could not win open elections and demanded institutions that would safeguard their control in spite of their lack of popularity: the reservation of 65% of the

seats in the Sejm for themselves and their allies along with a strong president elected by the legislature which, given a guaranteed control of 65% of the lower house, they thought they were sure to control. Neither Solidarity nor the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party [communist]), however, predicted the extent of Solidarity's victory. "Even the worst predictions (of the communists) saw Solidarity winning half of the seats, the PZPR's coalition a third of them ....[22]

In the rest of Eastern Europe, opposition information flows had reached few outside the best educated stratum. Communist leaders in these countries overestimated the depth and resilience of the opinions they had helped to create through control of the media. In consequence, when negotiations took place before the first free elections, communist parties tended to demand (details below) institutional arrangements that would benefit a dominant party, such as a strong elected presidency and majoritarian forms of representation. Opposition parties underestimated their own strength and settled for less than they might have gotten if perceptions on all sides had been more accurate.

As elections occurred, both inside each country and in other ex-communist countries, assessments by all parties of communist strength became more accurate, but uncertainty about which of the competing opposition groups would survive and which would become major players continued very high. Institutions designed or redesigned after the first round of elections tended to reflect this high level of uncertainty. Proportional representation, which protects small parties from annihilation, was, as noted by Lijphart, the universal response to this uncertainty in countries that devised new electoral rules after the first open election.

In every bargaining situation after fall 1989, as will be shown below, communists faced much higher costs for delay in coming to an agreement over institutions than did opposition parties. Except in Poland, the opposition initially lacked a grassroots organization, and the communists controlled the official media and local government.[23] These differences gave the communists important but rapidly declining electoral

resources. Early elections were a high priority for the communists, since they would increase the probability of controlling the government during the transitional period. Communist and successor parties at times traded earlier elections for less desirable institutional features.

The Preferences of Parties and Politicians in Eastern Europe

As the several parties involved in each country began negotiating new institutional arrangements, each sought choices that would give it an advantage over the competition or, at a minimum, insure its survival. Different parties tried to maximize the usefulness of their own characteristics and minimize the damage to be caused by their weaknesses. This section sketches the electorally motivated preferences of the different political actors engaged in negotiation over new institutions. The section following provides more extensive empirical detail.

Initially, communist parties preferred strong presidencies, which they expected to win or appoint, and majoritarian electoral systems.[24] The preference for majoritarian systems had three sources: the overestimation of their own popularity; the desire of many successor party politicians to run as individuals unhampered by the party label; and communist control at the local level, intact in all cases, which provided communist candidates with a pre-existing local political machine and patronage network. Redrawing electoral districts, necessary if proportional representation were to be adopted, would threaten these local electoral resources. If the electoral system remained unchanged, incumbents expected to benefit from their local entrenchment. In all cases, communist negotiators favored the institution of the presidency. They preferred a popularly elected president where they expected to win (Hungary in late 1989, Romania) since popular election would confer much more power and legitimacy on the holder of the office in any potential struggle with an unpredictable elected legislature. But they preferred a president elected by parliament where mass opposition had already become apparent, that

is, in Poland, or where the presidential election was expected to occur in the unpredictable future (Bulgaria).

Smaller parties and parties uncertain about their future preferred proportional representation. This category includes almost all opposition parties and communist parties after the first round of elections.[25] The exceptions among opposition parties were the largest Hungarian opposition parties and Walesa's supporters in Poland in fall 1990 and spring 1991. Because Hungary had allowed multicandidate elections after 1985, a number of opposition and reform-communist members of parliament had been elected in single member districts who, by 1989, enjoyed the incumbency advantage in their districts and preferred to maintain the same system. During debates in Poland, whichever faction of the Solidarity movement supported Walesa at any particular time favored half majority and half PR. The mixed system was originally proposed by the Citizens' Parliamentary Caucus (OKP, the leaders of which later formed the Democratic Union) in September 1990.[26] Writing in March 1991, however, one observer noted:

> While the unity of the nationwide citizens' committee movement seemed to promise a repetition of the victory of 'Walesa's team' as in June 1989, such an electoral system seemed good to the leaders of today's Democratic Union Caucus; now that 'Walesa's team' has split and the citizens' committee movement and the Solidarity labor union seem set to serve as an efficient electoral machine for the pro-Walesa Center Alliance of right-of-center groups and parties, the alliance is interested in its adoption, while the Democratic Union fears finding itself at a disadvantage and supports a proportional electoral system.[27]

Parties that contained charismatic personalities who had gained name recognition and popular respect for their opposition to the communist regime favored open-list proportional representation. A large number of votes for particular well-known names on the party list can elect other unknown candidates. Jan Bielecki's 115,002 votes, for example, also elected Liberal candidates Pavel Piskowski with 589 votes and Jacek Kurczewski with 588 votes.[28] Parties with fewer well-known personalities, and disciplined parties with an entrenched, dominant leader preferred the more standard closed-list system.[29] Closed-list PR enhances party discipline and the power of party

leaders relative to members, since leaders determine the order of the list and hence candidates' electoral chances. The Democratic Union in Poland, which included most of the famous Solidarity activists except Walesa, and a number of other small Polish opposition parties favored the open list. Almost all communist and successor parties[30] and most other opposition parties favored the closed list. Poland is the only country in this set in which the opposition had been sufficiently widespread and effective to have produced well-known and highly regarded political figures. In Hungary, where opposition had also had a long and honorable history, the best known reformers were concentrated inside the communist party and thus unavailable as opposition heroes. A single-member district system would seem to serve the interests of reform communists better than open-list PR, since single-member district systems lead to an emphasis on the individual politician while downplaying the party label.

Institutional Choices in the Real World

Given these preferences and the pattern of change in relative bargaining power noted above, we would expect stronger presidencies and more majoritarian systems of legislative representation to be associated with communist parties that were relatively strong at the time the institutions were chosen. As Table 1 shows, these expectations are consistent with reality.

[Table 1 about here]

The left-hand column of Table 1 shows the fora within which institutional decisions were made in chronological order for each country. The next column describes the strength of the communist party or its main successor in the relevant forum at the time when decisions were being made, and lists the most important historical factors that affected communist or successor party strength. In Poland, for example, communist strength is considered high in spring 1989 because of the existence of uncertainty about the Soviet threat to intervene, even though widespread popular opposition to the PZPR

was apparent. I judged communist strength to be medium between June 1989 and October 1991, even though the June electoral results and public opinion polls showed public support to be low because the PZPR and its successors continued to control the largest bloc of votes in the Sejm as a result of the Roundtable agreement. Similar criteria were used in the other cases. Although an element of subjectivity necessarily enters into these categorizations, I have made every effort to base them on contemporary statements and descriptions by participants and observers rather than inferring them post hoc from known outcomes. The third column notes the most essential features of the presidency, and the fourth, the system of representation in the legislature.

As column four shows, in the initial stage of reform when the communist party was at its strongest, all electoral systems were at least partly majoritarian. In the systems with the strongest communist or successor parties (Poland in spring 1989 and Romania in winter 1990), the first systems announced were not only entirely majoritarian but not fully democratic. Poland's arrangement reserved 65% of the seats in the lower house for the PZPR and their coalition partners. Romania's Senate included seats for 15 appointed military officers. Poland's first partly competitive election took place under these rules before Soviet withdrawal became certain. In Romania, however, where the Soviet threat no longer existed and Ceausescu had recently been overthrown by massive demonstrations in the streets, a new round of demonstrations forced the NSF (National Salvation Front, the communist successor) to include opposition parties in a newly formed Provisional Council for National Unity and to negotiate with them over electoral rules, which resulted in the abandonment of the majoritarian system.[31]

In both Bulgaria and Hungary, initial institutional arrangements were negotiated at round tables in circumstances in which reform communists controlled nearly all the political resources in the country but faced growing opposition and could no longer call on Soviet protection.[32] Communist negotiators compromised on the institutional details in exchange for a timely agreement and early elections in an obviously deteriorating

situation.[33] The Hungarian roundtable agreement was modified in the direction of greater majoritarianism by an activist National Assembly dominated by reform communists.[34] The original agreement had included an equal number of single member and district level proportional seats, with the remainders from the single member districts distributed proportionately among national lists. This system, like the German, would have resulted in a highly proportional system in spite of the existence of a large number of single member districts. The final version passed by the National Assembly increased the number of single member districts in response to legislators' demands and changed the basis for calculating the distribution of the national list to the remainders in the proportional contests, thus increasing the majoritarian bias in the system substantially.

In all but Hungary, the initial majoritarian or partly majoritarian system was abandoned in favor of proportional representation after initial elections (in Romania, massive demonstrations) led to the realization of their own potential weakness by communist successor parties that still controlled majorities in the legislatures. The weak opposition parties of Bulgaria and Romania as well as the highly fragmented opposition parties of Poland almost all also favored proportional representation.[35]

Only in Hungary did the first election result in control of the legislature for the opposition, a victory greatly magnified for the top party by the majoritarian features of the system. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) received 24.4% of the votes in the first round proportional districts, but nearly 43% of the seats when the single member districts and run-offs were added. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which came in second with 21.7% of the proportional vote in the first round, also benefited slightly from the system, while all other parties, including the Socialists (MSZP, communist successors) were disadvantaged.[36] Not surprisingly, the majority in the Hungarian National Assembly saw no reason to change a system that had treated them well so far.[37]

Turning now to the presidency, we see a similar pattern of politicians favoring institutions expected to contribute to their own future electoral success. Communist and successor parties in all cases initially favored a presidency with substantial powers as a brake on a potentially unruly or unpredictable elected legislature.[38] In all cases, the communists either already controlled the presidency or expected to win proposed elections. With the Sejm elections rigged by the roundtable agreement, Polish communists could count on General Jaruzelski's election by the combined legislature. Hungarian reform communists confidently expected the election of one of their number, popular Imre Pozsgay, and no other equally popular figure had emerged from within the opposition. In Bulgaria, the pre-reform National Assembly had elected reform communist Petar Mladenov to the presidency for a term expected to run throughout the term of the first elected legislature.[39] In Romania, it was expected that former communist Ion Iliesco, who occupied the presidency of the Council of the National Salvation Front when negotiations with the opposition began, would win a popular presidential election.

Only in Romania did events conform to successor party expectations. Iliescu won presidential elections, first in May 1990, and again in September 1992. The Romanian constitution, drafted by the National Assembly dominated by the NSF, in 1991 reaffirmed the powers of the presidency.[40]

Communist plans for the presidency went awry first in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Bulgaria, reform communist president Mladenov was unexpectedly forced to resign by popular demonstrations. As a result, a new president had to be elected by the National Assembly more than a year early. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, communist successor) did not have enough votes in the legislature to elect (2/3 needed) one of their own number. Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the opposition UDF (Union of Democratic Forces) was the compromise solution.[41] The constitution adopted in July 1991, written by the elected National Assembly and also requiring a two-thirds majority, provides for a

popularly elected president with limited powers. Zhelev won the first competitive presidential election by a narrow margin in January 1992.

In Hungary, two opposition parties refused to sign the roundtable agreement and led a campaign for a referendum to postpone presidential elections until after the election of a democratic parliament.[42] The referendum passed, and, as a result, not only was the election postponed, but the power to define the scope of the presidency and the mode of election passed to the new legislature. The legislature, jealous of its own prerogatives, decided to elect the president itself and limit the powers of the presidency. Hungary has the weakest presidency of the four, and Bulgaria the next weakest.

In Poland, communist plans for the presidency went awry even more spectacularly since not only did they lose control of the office, but the presidency remained strong in the hands of their most famous opponent. Approximately a year after his election, General Jaruzelski was persuaded to resign by a popular campaign for a freely elected presidency mounted by Lech Walesa and one faction of Solidarity. After Walesa's election in December 1990, the Roundtable Sejm fought tooth and nail to limit presidential powers.[43] They fought Walesa to a standstill on many issues but never managed to curtail presidential powers. The Little Constitution, promulgated fall 1992, clarifies the roles of the president, prime minister, and legislature, and is expected to reduce conflict, but leaves the Polish presidency relatively strong.[44]

The parties that support a strong presidency in Poland have shifted with the shifting winds of Walesa's alliances. In the months following Walesa's election, the Center Alliance (Centrum), the faction of Solidarity that had supported his presidential campaign, fought for a strong presidency while the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna), the faction of Solidarity that had supported Mazowiecki in the presidential elections, sought to limit the powers of the presidency. Since late 1991, when Walesa reestablished cooperation with the Democratic Union, these positions have been reversed. In short, whichever party or alliance controls the presidency or expects to

control it in the near future supports broad powers for the president, while parties in opposition to the president seek to limit his powers.

The evidence from these cases thus offers support for some but not all of the arguments proposed by Lijphart and Shugart and Carey. Communist negotiators did, as Lijphart suggests, attempt to create presidencies with substantial powers as a hedge against future uncertainty. Their aim was to create a strong executive office under their own control for the duration of the transition period and thus to limit change. In the words of an observer of the Polish Roundtable, "This arrangement was intended to guarantee communist control over political developments at least until the next elections, which were expected to take place in four years ...."[45] Communists may also have sought to multiply the number of offices for which they could compete in the future. Strong presidencies[46] have been maintained in countries in which the president has the support of the strongest party and in which the legislature -- which in all countries has contested presidential power -- is relatively weak. In other words, strong presidencies are supported by the parties that benefit from their alliance with the president, and opposed by parties that do not and by legislators who, all else equal, have an interest in defending the powers and prerogatives of their own institution. There is no evidence from these cases that the presidency is seen as a cooperative solution among parties to a shared problem of uncertainty.

Shugart and Carey have argued that strong presidencies tend to be associated with weak parties, and these cases add further support for their argument. The weakest parties (or at least weakest opposition parties) and strongest presidencies are in Poland and Romania. Their suggestion that this association comes about through delegation of powers by the legislature to the president, however, is not supported by the evidence. Strong presidencies, where they exist, were established prior to or at the same time as freely elected legislatures. Legislatures have in all cases made efforts to curtail the independent powers of the presidency. They have had more success in doing so in

countries in which the opposition parties (that is, parties other than the president's) in the legislature are relatively large and strong.

Opposition parties may be weak either because of general fragmentation and weakness in the party system or because of the great strength of the president's party, a condition that is only likely to occur in Eastern Europe as a result of the continued strength of the communist successor party. I would suggest that an extremely fragmented party system makes for a weak legislature, as does the continued domination of a communist successor party over small weak opposition parties. An alternative explanation, then, for the association between weak parties and strong presidencies found by Shugart and Carey is that weak, fragmented parties undermine the legislature's ability to pursue its own aggrandizement at the expense of the presidency and thus contribute to the accretion of presidential powers.

Up to this point, this study has focused on demonstrating a strong and direct relationship between politicians' desire to improve their own electoral chances and their choices with regard to new democratic political institutions. The incentives created by electoral competition have affected East European politicians, including those whose entire careers had been spent in communist party politics, in exactly the same way they would affect a politician in any other setting faced with the same choices. One might argue that post-Leninist politicians made more mistakes in their institutional choices than politicians with more democratic political experience would have, either because circumstances were changing too quickly or because they lacked a feel for democratic politics. One could not argue, however, that the basic underlying logic of their choices derived from norms or a worldview distinctive to the Leninist experience. The behavior of political elites in this issue domain shows no evidence of the persistence of a special Leninist legacy.

Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America:
The Other Leninist Legacy

Comparing negotiations over institutional choice in Eastern Europe with Latin America emphasizes the strong similarities in the institutional preferences of similar political actors in the two areas. Most obviously, dominant parties (e.g., the PRI in Mexico, the nineteenth century PAN in Argentina) have preferred majoritarian systems of legislative representation, while smaller parties and parties uncertain of their future electoral strength have preferred proportional representation. Parties that control the presidency or expect to control it in the near future and individual politicians who hold the office or hope to hold it in the future (what Latin Americanists call the presidenciables) have been the strongest advocates of extending presidential powers and continuing the presidentialist form of executive.[47]

Differences in outcomes in the two regions derive more from differences in pre-existing institutional arrangements than from differences in the norms or motivations of political elites. A full catalog of such differences would be long and complicated, but two of the most important can be discussed here: the institutional blank slate left by the "Leninist extinction," to use Jowitt's phrase; and the near absence of autonomous interest groups (with the partial exception of labor in Poland) that either are or could quickly be linked to class- or interest-based parties.

One of the most striking differences between Eastern Europe and Latin America is the much greater influence of the pre-authoritarian insitutional legacy on the choice of new institutions during transitions to democracy in Latin America as compared with Eastern Europe. It would seem that transitions to democracy would offer an opportunity for relatively easy institutional change. Such transitions are periods of great political ferment and creativity. They are a time for political soul searching about the causes of previous democratic breakdowns. It seems natural to write new constitutions and electoral rules during democratic transitions, both as a means of ridding the polity of laws decreed by

the authoritarian regime and as a way of trying to fortify the new democratic system against future breakdowns. Yet, notwithstanding the apparent fluidity of the transition phase, in Latin America little institutional change has occurred during redemocratizations. Most of the time, the rules and procedures of the earlier democratic period, though sometimes long suppressed, are simply revived.[48]

Institutions used in the past resurface during transitions when they are useful to the politicians who emerge to compete in the new political context. At any particular time, the parties that dominate political life in a democracy will tend to be those that are well-adapted to functioning in the current institutional environment and that can benefit from its idiosyncracies. This is one of the reasons such institutions are "sticky," that is, difficult to change. When a military or other authoritarian regime comes to power and simply outlaws parties, as most did in Latin America during the sixties and seventies, the parties go underground. They continue to function, though in a much reduced fashion. The parties lose contact with casual adherents, but committed activists maintain clandestine organizations at least as long as the original generation of activists survives. Consequently, when the dictatorship, in preparing to relinquish power, allows the reemergence of parties, the old party system arises phoenix-like from the ashes of repression. These parties still have essentially the same interests they had before, they represent the same societal groups, they benefit from the same features of the institutional environment, and thus they have little to gain from making risky changes in political rules.

Modern military regimes in Latin America have lasted at most twenty-one years, and in all but Brazil the continuity between pre- and post-authoritarian parties is striking. Even in Brazil, although the party system was changed by military manipulation, many individual who had established themselves as imporatnt political actors during the 1946-64 democratic period either continued an active political life in the military government or played an important role during the long period of redemocratization (1974-85) an

reemerged, along with their informal followings, as major political actors in the new democratic regime.[49]

In Eastern Europe, in contrast, the forty year period of Leninist rule and the more systematic attack by Leninist rulers on virtually all autonomous organizations resulted in a more thorough destruction of traditional parties. At the same time, the communist parties, like the parties created by the military in Brazil, created a channel of upward mobility and road to political power that diverted many individuals with a vocation for politics away from the old parties and into the new. Of the cases examined here, only in Romania did the traditional parties reemerge and survive the first set of competitive elections, and even in Romania they remain small and weak. New parties that have arisen during the dictatorship, either as supporters of the regime or as opposition, have no stake in the rules and institutions of the pre-Leninist regime. In consequence, current institutional choices in Eastern Europe, in contrast to those in Latin America, show relatively little continuity with pre-Leninist institutions.

The second striking difference between Eastern Europe and Latin America follows from the effects of industrialization in different contexts on the creation of interest groups in society and, in consequence, on the links between interest groups and parties. In most capitalist countries, industrialization has resulted in the dominance, as expressed in the party system, of the capital-labor cleavage over other potential sources of cleavage (ethnic, religious, urban-rural). There are some obvious and well-known exceptions to this statement, but in most industrialized countries, even those in which two parties converge to the center of the political spectrum, it is possible to array most parties on a left-right continuum that ranges from representatives of those who own no capital to representatives of those who own much.

East European parties can also be arrayed from left to right in terms of their economic policy preferences, but their linkages to interest groups are for the most part not well-established, long-standing, or, in many cases, even apparent. Survey research done in

Hungary, for example, shows no relationship between class and party preference. Working- and lower-class background is associated with support for a strong state role in the provision of welfare, with intolerance for income inequality, and with aversion to capitalism, as would be expected. And different parties gave promises about welfare, equality, and the rapidity of the transition to capitalism a prominent place in their campaigns. Nevertheless, party preference was unrelated to any of these attitudes or to either self-defined or objectively measured class.[50]

In the Leninist regimes, the principal political cleavage was between party apparatchiks and managers on the one hand and ordinary people on the other. In Jowitt's words, "For forty years ... ruling Leninist parties persistently defined and asserted themselves ... as the exclusive autarchic locus of political leadership and membership. The political consequence was to reinforce the traditional stark gap between a privileged domineering official realm, and a private mutually suspicious realm...."[51] With the destruction of the Leninist systems, this cleavage has declined in salience (though not disappeared since the managers and bureaucrats have not disappeared), but the capital-labor cleavage has yet to emerge in full force. With the partial exception of Poland, interest groups have not yet made the transition from communist controlled to independent organizations capable of exerting political influence. In fact, since it ceased to be compulsory, union membership has declined. In Hungary, the number of members in the pre-transition union has dropped from about 4.5 million to about two million, while newly created unions have attracted only 300,000-400,000.[52]

It may be that, objectively, the most important economic cleavage currently in most post-communist countries is between the declining public sector and the rising private sector rather than that between capital and labor. This dichotomy too lacks organization and political representation.

This difference in the underlying structure of interests leads to differences in the party system. Party leaders in transitional periods search especially actively for policies and

particular benefits they can use to attract the support of groups in society and thus assure their own political survival. Where the parties are new, as in Eastern Europe, they are relatively unconstrained by past commitments and reputation effects in their search for support.

Society offers the raw material for multiple but not unlimited dimensions along which to organize party competition. At any time, but especially at times of great political and economic ferment and fluidity such as the present in Eastern Europe, multiple potential ways of defining societal interests and divisions exist. Not all of the potential divisions will become politicized. Self-interested politicians play a role in determining which potential societal divisions become politicized. A striking example of the failure to politicize an obvious social polarization, especially in contrast to recent East European experience, is that ethnicity remains largely unpoliticized in Latin American democracies. Only in Bolivia has a significant political party used an appeal to disadvantaged ethnic groups (which form substantial parts of the populations of several countries) as a basis for electoral mobilization.

Furthermore, not all politicized divisions survive the passage of time. Such divisions are far more likley to remain politically central if they become enshrined in political institutions chosen during the brief periods of rapid institutional evolution that punctuate the much longer and more common periods of institutional stability and resistance to change. Politicians, as shown above, often make these institutional choices based on immediate electoral calculations with little regard for, or understanding of, their probable long-term effects.

In Eastern Europe, politicians have moved quickly to mobilize ethnic differences into party support (the Movement for Rights and Freedom that represents Turkish interests in Bulgaria, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, as well as numerous small ethnically based parties in every country, not to mention the Croatian Democratic Union and Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia) and, to a lesser extent, urban rural

differences (significant peasant parties in all four countries). Communist successor parties are attempting to establish themselves as representatives of working-class interests, but the transition from autocrat to representative is a difficult one to make, especially in countries with relatively well educated and politically sophisticated populations. So far, communist successor parties have had only modest success consolidating working-class support in the countries in which competitive democracies have been established.[53] Powerful West European-style labor or social democratic parties linked to organized labor have not arisen,[54] even though a larger part of the population works in blue-collar industry in Eastern Europe than in either Western Europe or Latin America.

The result of the general disorganization of interest groups and the weak linkage between urban labor and political parties is that the parts of the population most hurt by the transition to capitalism have not had much ability to make effective demands for policy changes. This is not to say that they are totally powerless. They have strikes, demonstrations, and the vote, which can be used as a blunt instrument with which to punish incumbents held responsible for policies that have caused welfare losses. District level electoral data from Poland and Bulgaria strongly suggest a connection between real wage declines, unemployment, and votes against incumbents -- as would be expected. The victory of the Democratic Left Alliance (communist successors) in the Polish parliamentary elections of September 1993 has been attributed to their appeal to state employees, pensioners, and industrial workers in state firms hurt by economic reforms.[55] Their victory, at this writing, is expected to result in greater concern for the distribution of the costs and benefits of reform, but not to radical change in economic policy.

Without party leadership to articulate an alternative economic ideology and coordinate an alliance of multiple interests that could benefit from an alternative set of economic policies, the ability of losers to interfere with the transition to capitalism is limited. They can slow it down, but they cannot divert it onto an altogether different

road. Economic hardship seems to be creating less predictability about which parties will succeed in consolidating mass support, as voters punish one set of incumbents after another. But in none of the post-Leninist countries that have adopted democratic institutions do we see at this point the emergence of populist parties or coalitions capable of winning elections and reversing the transition to capitalism. Nor do we see organizations representing owners' interests frustrated by their inability to get economic policies they consider tolerable and therefore willing to back an authoritarian intervention. In other words, the Peronist alternative that many, including myself, thought initially a fairly likely outcome in Eastern Europe now seems a more remote possibility. The threat of authoritarianism seems much more closely linked to the mobilization of ethnic nationalism and fear than to economic hardship by itself.

The transition to capitalism is moving most slowly in Eastern Europe not in those countries in which competitive political systems give injured interests the greatest opportunity to resist reforms, but in the least democratic countries in which renamed communist parties have retained most power. The impediment to reform in these countries is not injured interests empowered by democracy, but rather vested interests within and allied to regimes that have been modified by recent political events but not fundamentally changed. The experience of Eastern Europe with economic liberalization thus does not differ greatly from that of Latin America or Southern Europe. In both regions, several democratic countries have carried out important steps in the direction of economic liberalization that entailed large costs to substantial parts of the population without causing regime breakdown, though about half of the initiating incumbents have been defeated in the first subsequent election.[56] The current crop of Latin American democracies has proven far more resistant to breakdown, despite catastrophic economic conditions, than observers initially predicted.

Though it is too early to speak with any certainty, so far there is little evidence of inconsistency between democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe. The survival of

democratic institutions in countries that established them during the transition has not so far been threatened by withdrawal of support caused by disillusionment with capitalism.[57] The greater threat to the establishment of democracy seems to have come in countries in which former communists were able to mobilize widespread support for themselves on the basis of ethnic nationalism and thus to derail the initial creation of democratic institutions. These are the countries in which predictions of turbulence, tumult, and breakdown seem to have been most apt.

Institutions and Culture

Where democratic institutions have taken root, however shallowly, during post-Leninist transitions, they have created a set of compelling incentives that structure the behavior of political elites and thus lead to outcomes similar to the outcomes that would occur in other democratic settings. Among the dynamics inherent in even seriously flawed competitive systems are the tendency of aspiring political leaders to mobilize previously excluded groups into the political system in order to support their own challenges to established leaders; and the tendency of leadership competition within parties to lead to party splits, even when the splits undermine party dominance or reduce the probability that the party will win the next election. Such a split has created the greatest threat so far to the continued dominance by the communist successor party in Romania, where opposition parties shown no sign of being able to dislodge it. As a result, even narrow and flawed democracies contain within them forces that often lead, over the long term, to more inclusionary and more competitive political systems.

The cultural legacies of Leninism hostile to democracy will not of course disappear overnight. Neither, however, are cultural traits static or indefinitely self-perpetuating. To persist, they must be reinforced by formal and informal institutions.[58] To the extent that the cultural legacies of the Leninist experience are inconsistent with democratic institutions, they are currently being eroded in the countries of Eastern Europe in which

democracy holds sway. And the longer these institutions persist, the greater the erosion will be. Some of the currently democratic countries of Eastern Europe will probably suffer authoritarian interludes in the future. These interludes, however, will not wipe away the legacy of democracy now being created, any more than authoritarian interludes in Latin America have done so.

Periods of rapid institutional change occur rarely. Most of the time, institutions, like species, change only incrementally. Vested interests in political institutions develop with amazing rapidity. The current period of institutional creativity can thus be expected to have long-term consequences. As can be seen in the final time period for each country in Table 1, the pace of institutional change in Eastern Europe seems already to be subsiding. There will undoubtedly be upheavals in some countries, but nevertheless, it appears that a period of greater institutional stability has arrived. For countries able to maintain competive systems, the institutions created during the last few years are likely to structure politics for a long time to come. For countries that undergo periods of authoritarianism in the future, redemocratization can be expected to bring in its train a return to many of the institutions recently created.

Notes

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[2]"A Research Agenda for Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 4 (1990): 193-97; "A World Without Leninism," in Robert Slater, ed., *Global Restructuring and the Third World* (Boulder: Lynn Reiner, 1991); "The Leninist Legacy," in Ivo Banac, ed, *Eastern Europe in the 1990's* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); *The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[3]See, for example, Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[4]For example, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment," in Jeffrey Sachs, ed., *Debt and Economic Performance: Selected Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1990): 51-69; Arturo Valenzuela, "Origins and Characteristics of the Chilean Party System: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government," Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, Working Paper No. 164, 1985; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming.

[5]"Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[6]Michael Coppedge, "The Evolution of Latin American Party Systems," in Arturo Valenzuela, ed., *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Timothy Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

[7]See, for example, Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choice in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-91," presented Center for German and European Studies, UC, Berkeley,, 1992.

[8]For example, Armen Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," *Journal of Political Economy* 58 (1950); Douglass North and Robert Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981); Yoram Barzel, *Economic Analysis of Property Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Oliver Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

[9]Douglass North, especially *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) is an exception, as is Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) who draws on this economic literature to build a political argument.

[10]"Presidencies and Parties in Latin America: Institutional Choices and Consequences," presented Latin American Studies Association, Los Angeles, 1992.

[11]"Of Presidents and Parliaments," *East European Constitutional Review* 2 (1993): 30-32.

[12]"Democratization and Constitutional Choices."

[13]For details on the translation of votes into seats in Hungary, see John Hibbing and Samuel Patterson, "Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," *Comparative Political Studies* 24 (1992): 430-54.

[14]Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957); David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press, 1977); Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* , 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

[15]Barbara Geddes, "Democratic Institutions as Bargains among Self-Interested Politicians," presented American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1990.

[16]Kjell Engelbrekt and Rada Nikolaev, "Bulgaria: Socialist Party Elects New Leader," *RFE/RL Research Report* (January 17, 1992): 27-30; Michael Shafir, "Public Opinion One Year after Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* ((June 14, 1991): 22-28; Voytek Zubek, "The Threshold of Poland's Transition: 1989 Electoral Campaign as the Last Act of United Solidarity," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 24 (1991): 355-76.

[17]Kjell Engelbrekt, "Cracks in the Union of Democratic Forces," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (May 17, 1991): 1-8; Engelbrekt and Duncan Perry, "The Run-up to the National Elections: Politics and Parties," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (October 11, 1991): 4-9; Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva, "Political Institutions and Party System in Bulgaria11989-1992," manuscript, Sofia University, Bulgaria; Perry, "Bulgaria: A New Constitution and Free Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* (January 3, 1992): 78-82; Michael Shafir, "'War of the Roses' in Romania's National Salvation Front," *RFE/RL Research Report* (January 24, 1992): 15-22; Gabriel Topor, "The National Salvation Front in Crisis," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (August 16, 1991): 24-29; Louisa Vinton, "Solidarity's Rival Offspring: Center Alliance and Democratic Action," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (September 21, 1990): 15-25; Zubek, "The Threshold."

[18]Zubek, "The Threshold," p. 361.

[19]Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (1989): 319-47.

[20]Geddes and Zaller, "Sources of Popular Support."

[21]Zubek, "The Threshold," pp. 356-57.

[22]Zubek, "The Threshold," p. 363.

[23]Mincheva, "Political Institutions"; Vladimir Socor, "Political Parties Emerging," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (February 16, 1990): 28-35; Luan Troxel, "Socialist Persistence in the Bulgarian Elections of 1990-1991," *East European Quarterly* 26 (1993): 407-30. For discussions of later efforts to democratize local governments in various countries, see Dan Ionescu, "Government Moves to Recentralize Local Administration," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (September 7, 1990): 19-24; Jan Kubik, "Local Government: The Basic Laws and Most Common Problems," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (May 31, 1991):19-22; Judith Pataki, "Local Elections Expected to Complete the Political Transition," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (October 5, 1990): 18-22; Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Local Self-Government: The Legal Framework," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (May 4, 1990): 24-27; Michael Shafir, "Romania Prepares for Local Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* (January 31, 1992): 15-22; Shafir, "Romanian Local Elections Herald New Political Map," *RFE/RL Research*

Report (March 13, 1992): 18-23; Louisa Vinton, "Political Parties and Coalitions in the Local Government Elections," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (June 29, 1990): 26-29.

[24]Rada Nikolaev, "Preparations for Free Elections of a Grand National Assembly," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (June 15, 1990): 6-10.

[25]Louisa Vinton, "The Debate over the 'Political Calender'," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (November 2, 1990): 13-19; Nikolaev, "Preparations for Free Elections."

[26]David McQuaid, "The 'War' over the Electoral Law," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (August 2, 1991): 12; Vinton, "The Debate": 16.

[27]Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Sejm Rejects President's Proposals for Early Elections," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (March 22, 1991): 19.

[28]Frances Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991," *Soviet Studies* 44 (1992): 851.

[29]McQaid, "The 'War' over the Electoral Law."

[30]The successor party in Poland was divided and took no official position. The argument in favor of the open list in Poland is that, given the extreme fragmentation of the party system and the near absence of party loyalties in the population, the additional personal accountability implied by the open-list sytem would aid party building. It was expected, on the one hand, to give legislators a strong incentive to pay attention to constituents, and, on the other, to allow voters to punish candidates who had not lived up to expectation without necessarily punishing their parties. My thanks to Jerszy Wiatr for helping me to understand this aspect of the debate in Poland.

[31]Michael Shafir, "The Provisional Council of National Unity: Is History Repeating Itself?" *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (March 2, 1990): 18-24; Shafir, "The Electoral Law," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (May 4, 1990): 28-32.

[32]Mincheva, "Political Institutions"; Vera Gavrilov, "Communist Party and Opposition Sign Key Political Agreements," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (April 6, 1990): 1-4; Gavrilov, "National Assembly Elects Mladenov President and Sets Stage for Elections," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (April 27, 1990): 9-10; Alfred Reisch, "Cliffhanger Referendum Changes Political Timetable," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (January 12, 1990): 9-13.

[33]Nikolaev, "Preparations for Free Elections."

[34]Judith Pataki, "Hungarian Electoral Law Complicates Elections," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (March 9, 1990): 33-35.

[35]McQuaid, "The 'War' over the Election Law"; Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Sejm Rejects"; Vinton, "The Debate." For details of the Polish electoral law, see Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Elections."

[36]Hibbing and Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature," pp. 436-37.

[37]The recent split in the MDF may lead to demands to change the system, since there is now some chance that the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, communist successor) will be the main beneficiary in the next election.

[38]Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Powers of the Presidency," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (November 2, 1990): 20-23; Michael Shafir, "The Electoral Law," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (October 19, 1990): 31-37.

[39]Gavrilov, "National Assembly Elects Mladenov"; Mincheva, "Political Institutions."

[40]Michael Shafir, "Romania's New Institutions: The Draft Constitution," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (September 20, 1991): 22-33; Shafir, "Romania: Constitution Approved in Referendum," *RFE/RL Research Report* (January 10, 1992): 50-55.

[41]Mincheva, "Political Institutions"; Rada Nikolaev, "The Bulgarian Presidential Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* (February 7, 1992): 6-10; Duncan Perry, "Dissident Becomes New President," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (August 17, 1990): 3-6.

[42]Alfred Reisch, "The New Coalition Government: Its First 100 Days and Beyond," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (October 12, 1990): 10-18; Reisch, "Cliffhanger Referendum."

[43]Louisa Vinton, "Walesa, 'Special Powers,' and the Balcerowicz Plan," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (July 19, 1991): 15-23; Vinton, "A Postcommunist Parting Shot: Round-table Sejm Rejects 'Special Powers'," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (October 4, 1991): 10-16.

[44]Louisa Vinton, "Poland's 'Little Constitution' Clarifies Walesa's Powers," *RFE/RL Research Report* (September 4, 1992): 19-26; "Special Reports: A 'Little Constitution' in Poland," *East European Constitutional Review* 1:3 (fall 1992) 12-14.

[45]Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland in 1989," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* (January 5, 1990): 25.

[46]Matt Shugart has pointed out that only the Polish president is strong in the sense of having veto power. Nevertheless, the continuous struggles among president, government, and parliament in all the cases in which the president is popularly elected attest to the real power of presidents in these countries to block legislative initiatives at least some of the time. Even in Hungary, the president's struggle to increase the range of his influence has not been trivial.

[47]Cf. Geddes, "Democratic Institutions as Bargains."

[48]Geddes, "Democratic Institutions as Bargains."

[49]Frances Hagopian, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

[50]László Bruszt and János Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary and Eastern Europe," presented Southern California Workshop on Political and Economic Liberalization, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1992.

[51]"A World Without Leninism."

[52]Bruszt and Simon, "The Great Transformation," p. 196.

[53]Communist successor parties have been successful where they have based their appeal on nationalism, most notably in Serbia and Romania, and they have successfully attracted votes from the least educated and sophisticated parts of the population in rural areas, especially in Bulgaria and Romania. But their efforts to represent the interests of workers hurt by the transition to capitalism have so far been only moderately successful, especially in the more developed countries that have more sophisticated populations. See Stanislaw Gebethner, "Proportional Representation versus Majoritarian Systems: Free Elections and Political Parties in Transitions to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," presented Conference on Institutional Design and Democratization, Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, UC, San Diego, 1993. for the territorial distribution of party strength in Poland.

[54]A social democratic party exists, of course, in the former East Germany as a result of unification. East German workers, however, tended to vote for the Christian Democrats in the last elections.

[55]To keep the victory of the Democratic Left Alliance over the Democratic Union in perspective, we should note that the DLA increased its vote between 1991 and 1993 from 11.9% to 20.4%, while the DU decreased from 12.3% to 10.6%. In the very fragmented Polish party system, it is not necessary to receive anything near a majority of the vote in order to win an election. The top vote getting party has to be able to put together a

coalition in order to govern. (For election results, see *The Economist,* September 25, 1993, p. 64.)

[56]Substantial reforms have been carried out by Spain, Turkey, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, all democratic by standard definitions. See Barbara Geddes, "Political Institutions and Economic Policy: Or How Politicians Decide Who Bears the Costs of Structural Adjustment," presented American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1991, and Geddes, "Democracy, Labor, and Structural Adjustment," presented at Conference on the Social Consequences of Liberalization in Comparative Perspective, Joint Center for African Studies, UC, Berkeley, 1993, for discussions of the effects of economic liberalization on the urban working class in eleven countries, the political factors conducive to privatization in democratic and partially democratic countries, and an explanation of why the social groups injured by economic reform have often been unable to impede it even in fully competitive democracies.

[57]Low levels of vote turn-out are often cited as evidence of declining support for democracy in Eastern Europe, but there is no real evidence that low turn-out makes regime change more likely. This interpretation of turn-out in Eastern Europe seems especially problematic, since turn-out is much higher in Romania and Bulgaria than in Poland and Hungary.

[58]Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 1171-91.

Table 1
Relationship Between Communist Strength and Institutional Outcome

Decision Forum	Communist Strength	Presidency	Parliament
POLAND:			
Round Table 2-4/89	High: Uncertain Sov threat	Elected by Leg., broad powers	Majoritarian, with 65% of Sejm reserved for CP and their allies
Sejm and Senate 6/89-10/91	Med: CP majority in Sejm; popular support low	Popular election, majority/run-off	PR
Sejm and Senate 10/91-9/93	Low: CP Small party in leg, pop support low	Some compromise on presidential powers	No change
HUNGARY:			
Round Table 6-9/89 National Assembly 10/89	High: National Assembly dominated by CP; Sov threat declining, not gone	Popular election of president, powers unspecified	1/2 majoritarian with run-offs, 1/2 PR
Popular Referendum 11/26/89	Med: Sov threat gone, pop opposition rising	Election postponed till after free election of Parliament	
National Assembly 3/90-3/94	Low: CP small party in leg, popular support low	Parliamentary election of pres, powers limited	No change
BULGARIA			
Round Table 3-6/90	High: No Sov threat, but almost no organized opposition	Current CP pres to continue; next to be elected by leg, substantial powers	1/2 majoritarian with runoffs, 1/2 PR
National Assembly 6/90-10/91	Med-High: CP controls leg, but pop declining	Popular election, powers more limited	PR
National Assembly 10/91-	Med: UDF won parl and pres. elections; CP largest opposition	No change	No change
ROMANIA			
NSF 12/89-1/31/90	High: Opposition unorganized, not included in NSF	Popular election, substantial powers	Majoritarian, 15 officers appointed to Senate
PCNU 2-5/90	Med-High: Demos forced inclusion of opposition	Majority, run-off	PR
Chamber of Deps and Senate, 5/90-9/92	Med-High: NSF controls leg and pres; pop declining, but not rapidly	No change	No change